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BOOK REVIEW
WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS
By Abraham D. Sofaer, Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge,
Massachusetts
1976
pp. xxxvi, 533, $15.00
"War" almost inevitably generates national debate over
the prerogatives of the President and Congress with respect to
warmaking powers. Typical of such discussion was that engendered by the proposed amendment to the Foreign Military
Sales Act. Senator Strom Thurmond during Senate floor debate in 1970 urged that:
If we pass this amendment it will undermine the President in
carrying out his constitutional duty to do his utmost to provide
for the protection of our fighting men . . . . [Plassage of this
amendment would be met by jubilation in Hanoi, Moscow, Peking, and other Communist capitals throughout the world, as it
would signal the waving of a white flag to the forces of tyranny
and oppression.

116 CONG. REC. 11567 (1970).
Senator Church, on the other hand, defended the amendment by saying:
We in the Congress have been derelict far too long in placing
adequate restraints on the executive branch in the commitment
of our men and dollars abroad. As Senators we should concern
ourselves primarily with seeing that Congress carries out its responsibilities, not with the duties of the President. We should
worry, not so much about preserving the President's powers
which he will faithfully uphold . . . . This debate should be
focused, not on whether this proposal ties the President's
hands-it does not-but on whether it will help untie the knots
by which Congress has shackled its own powers.

116 CONG. REC. 18900 (1970).
I am hardly suggesting that students of foreign policy and
U.S. constitutional history prefer a state of war so they can
have such grist for their mills. However, the fact remains that

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 7:299

it is usually through foreign and military intercourse with other
nations that constitutional doctrine regarding the powers to
conduct foreign affairs and military action is clarified.
It was indeed the passion of this country's Indochina involvement which brought the American Bar Association to
commission a study such as War, ForeignAffairs, and Constitutional Power. Under the aegis of the A.B.A., Professor Sofaer
set out to study the powers of the President and Congress with
respect to foreign affairs and the conduct of war. From his
study project, this first volume has emerged as a definitive
constitutional history of early U.S. foreign affairs.
The study covers the time period from the Constitutional
Convention through the administration of John Quincy
Adams, with initial references to British constitutional experience and early state attempts to conduct foreign affairs during
the American Revolution and the era of the Articles of Confederation. As in most constitutional histories, the central importance of George Washington in establishing standard operating
procedures is outlined; however, Professor Sofaer's study goes
somewhat more in-depth into congressional-executive relations
during the Washington administration than have most constitutional histories. The study also notes that during the administration of John Adams the power of the President did not
expand significantly because of open congressional resistance
and because the Supreme Court ruled that, while both Congress and the President could initiate foreign and military activities, Congress retained the final word in warmaking policies.
Sofaer chronicles the changes in Thomas Jefferson's doctrine and practice after he assumed the Presidency in the tumultuous election of 1800. While Jefferson intended to pursue
a presidential style which was less centralized and secretive
than that adopted by either Washington or Adams, he came to
act more and more in a manner resembling that of his predecessors. The final chapter of the book is a 150-page compilation
of diplomatic and military affairs in the post-Jefferson administrations of Madison and Monroe, with an afterthought given
to John Quincy Adams. In Sofaer's account, these administrations are marked by further territorial expansion of the United
States into Florida, often carried out by the military operating
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with vague and legislatively-contested authority from the
Commander in Chief.
In Sofaer's monumental attempt to document the constitutional history of U.S. foreign affairs until roughly 1829, we
read of numerous examples of prototypical executive behavior
which became so visible during U.S. involvement with the rest
of the world after 1945. Some of the more common examples
include congressional acquiesence to executive initiative, sporadic congressional attempts to limit executive discretion in
the use of military force, U.S. intervention in the domestic
affairs of other countries, and presidential difficulties in convincing overly eager (and occasionally ruthless) officials to
carry out policies within the bounds of executive authority.
Except for the cast of characters, it is difficult at times to tell
just which century's history the book presents.
However, Sofaer and his associates have gone to great
lengths to drive home a central point about the constitutional
balance between the Presidents and Congress. While there are
numerous precedents in the behaviors of these early presidents
and legislators for the actions of our more recent officials, a
most crucial difference exists. The early presidents went to
great lengths to find legislative bases for their actions, such as
through the argument that an appropriation for a military force
provides implicit authority for the President to use that force
in the absence of a congressional declaration of war. Modern
presidents, however, have often gone some distance farther by
arguing that they possess inherent constitutional powers to
commit the country to military engagements by the sole virtue
of being Commander in Chief, chief appointive authority, and
central contact figure for foreign diplomats. It is with this important difference that Sofaer concludes his first volume.
The author and his colleagues followed closely their mandate from the A.B.A. to "study and report on the respective
powers under the Constitution of the President and Congress
to enter into and conduct war." The 118 pages of references at
the end and the multitude of footnotes throughout the book
attest to the exhaustive nature of the research which culminated in this volume. However, the book generally omits analyses of events and evaluations of other historical writings on
the events of this time period. Without doubt, much will be
written about the author's overt choice to avoid an argumenta-
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tive tone and to downplay historiographical debate. From this
perspective, the passion which gave life to the study project is
not conveyed in the text of the book.
Still, I cannot fault the book on this count. To charge that
the author abstained from polemics is accurate, but to contend
that he neither provides nor supports conclusions is shortsighted. On the whole, I am delighted that the book does not
provide an evaluation of each and every action on the battlefield (for I enjoy arriving at my own conclusion about General
Jackson's ruthless exercise of military authority in Florida) or
every presidential motive (for I enjoy arriving at my own conclusion about Monroe's duplicitous treatment of Jackson). The
book's charter was to provide a study of constitutional powers,
and it does so admirably in spite of an organization and an
editorial arrangement which at times make the book appear
the written product of a multi-disciplinary university committee.
However, the main effect of the book's organization and
arrangement is simply to limit its market to readers who are
already familiar with the general historical outline of the period. Thus the book will certainly have great benefit for upper
division and graduate courses in constitutional history, foreign
affairs, and national security studies. The main readership is
likely to be drawn from the ranks of lawyers, historians, political scientists, and military affairs specialists who want a thorough, detailed view of the actions which have defined the constitutional balance between Congress and the President with
respect to warmaking powers. This important book goes a long
way toward satisfying this desire. We can eagerly look forward
to future volumes by the Sofaer study group.
M. Glenn Newkirk*
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